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Reconsidering Britain’s soft power: lessons from
the perceptions of the Turkish political elite
Yaprak G€ursoy
Aston University
Abstract Enhancing Britain’s soft power has been a policy objective of the
Conservative-led governments in the past few years. Policy relevant research on
the matter mostly measures the positive perceptions of other countries’ publics toward
the UK. This article proposes to dig deeper into the attitudes of foreign decision-makers
in an unobtrusive manner to supplement these previous studies. As an illuminating
case study, it investigates the views of the Turkish politicians by using data from the
parliamentary proceedings of 2011–2018. This analysis reveals that the strongest soft
power asset of the UK in Turkey is its exemplary political values, government and
democracy. The biggest challenge is historical experiences of animosity that leads to
inherent mistrust. Evidence also demonstrates that the UK is seen more positively in
conjunction with other countries and more negatively on its own. This finding stresses
the significance of multilateral cooperation to augment UK’s soft power.
Introduction
How much soft power does Britain have? What are its greatest soft power
assets and how can it maintain and improve its resources? Ever since the con-
cept of soft power was first coined by Joseph Nye (1990), it has gained
increased traction in the UK, with recent academic papers analysing relative
British soft power in a number of areas, ranging from sports to development
aid (Pamment 2018; Woodward 2020). Beyond academia, foreign policymakers
in the UK have also given heed to Britain’s soft power assets and how to
enhance them. Defined in simple terms as the ability to ‘influence the behav-
iour of others’ through attraction and co-option and by making them ‘want
what you want’ (Nye 2004, 2), soft power projection has become one of the pri-
mary foreign policy goals of the UK. It is referenced in official national secur-
ity documents (HM Government 2015; 2018), parliamentary reports (House of
Commons 2011; House of Lords 2014), and the speeches of high-ranking offi-
cials (Hague 2012; Howell 2012; Hunt 2019). In recent years, while Brexit has
increased concerns over whether the UK would be able to maintain its soft
power, Global Britain became the UK’s main ‘international ambition’ (FCO
2019) in connection with trade openness and cooperation with countries out-
side of the European Union (Glencross and McCourt 2018; Daddow 2019).
In practice, ambitious policies such as Global Britain and official discus-
sions on how to enhance the UK’s soft power assets are mostly grounded in
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international indices of soft power. Aggregate results from these metrices have
placed the UK confidently among the top five globally, at least until recently.
This article analyses these studies and argues that they have inherent limita-
tions in measuring negative perceptions and in revealing the structural reasons
behind attitudes toward Britain. The article adopts a different methodology in
order to move beyond these weaknesses. The main data on political elite atti-
tudes comes from the Turkish National Assembly (TNA) proceedings between
2011 and 2018, analysed by using Qualitative Content Analysis tools (Schreier
2012). Turkey is an informative case because in public polls it has ranked the
UK’s soft power below the average it receives internationally, with no clear
explanation why that is the case. Understanding the strongest British soft
power assets in an overall more negative country, as well as the structural rea-
sons behind these adverse perceptions, would provide illuminating lessons to
the concept of soft power and British foreign policy-making.
The analysis of data from Turkish political elite perceptions confirms the
results of global public opinion polls and soft power indices in three respects.
First, it reinforces that ‘a successful model of domestic government is an
important feature of a nation’s overall attractiveness’ (McClory 2011, 11) and
‘the power of example is far more effective than preaching’ to other countries
what to do (Hill and Beadle 2014, 47). Among the Turkish political elite, the
most important asset of Britain is its political values and well-functioning lib-
eral government, with the longest history of parliamentary democracy. The UK
is an attractive role model in these areas, and it shapes the preferences, desires
and aspirations of the Turkish political elite, whether they are in government
or in opposition. After its political values, the UK is seen as an exemplary
country with its economic, justice, education and health systems.
Second, the results confirm the delicate balance between hard power and
soft power (Wilson 2008; Nye 2009). As several previous studies have also
argued, too much hard power, used in a way that is perceived as aggressive,
can erode soft power (Hill and Beadle 2014, 16–20; MacDonald 2018a, 75; 2019,
28–36). Turkish parliamentary proceedings point at this dilemma since, along
with positive attributes, Britain is also referenced with negative ones, as an
enemy or a threat against Turkish interests and a colonial or imperialist global
power with aggressive intentions. The simultaneous existence of positive and
negative perceptions emphasizes the limitations of soft power indices that only
focus on the former and ignore the latter.
Third, as several other studies have shown (Hill and Beadle 2014, 46;
MacDonald 2018b, 3; 2019, 46), this article demonstrates that Britain’s soft
power resources can be improved with continued devotion to multilateral
cooperation, in a way that embraces not only the Commonwealth countries
and the USA, but also Europe. Data from the Turkish parliament reveals that
Britain is mentioned alone as an enemy more than any other attribute.
Conversely, it is cited positively as a role model together with other global
cases, Europe and the US more often. The results indicate the value of acting
together with other countries rather than pursuing international goals alone.
This article also brings into light two new findings, contributing to the lit-
erature on British soft power. First, contrary to prior evidence, Britain’s attract-
iveness as an aid provider or as a global peacekeeper is seldom mentioned
and with no significant independent value attached to these international roles.
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This is an interesting result given that Turkey received £128.4 million Official
Development Assistance (ODA) from the UK in 2017, increasing by nearly a
hundredfold in two years, due to the UK’s donation to the EU Facility for
Refugees (UK Parliament 2019). Similarly, although the UK and Turkey
cooperate in a number of peacekeeping missions and define each other as stra-
tegic partners (House of Commons 2017), positive perceptions deriving from
these collaborations are low.
Second, it is clear from the data that Turkish political elite perceptions of
the UK rest on historical experiences, going back centuries. Turkey and the UK
have a long record of bilateral relations with ups and downs (G€oktepe 2012;
Barlas and G€ulmez 2018; MacArthur-Seal 2018; Karaca 2020; Hale 2020).
Although the 2010s can be considered as a period of close partnership in diplo-
macy, defence, trade and investment (Altın€ors 2020), the shadow of historical
animosities are hard to erase. British governments can themselves re-ignite
imperial and post-colonial visions when dealing with other countries
(Połonska-Kimunguyi and Kimunguyi 2017). Regardless of the use of such dis-
courses toward Turkey by UK officials, memories of Britain’s role in the col-
lapse of the Ottoman Empire and subsequent occupation and colonialization of
the Middle East has had lasting effects on how Turkish politicians view the
UK. Although Turkey itself was not colonized, Britain’s imperial history is
reflected in today’s negative perceptions. These attitudes can be described as
deep-seated mistrust that cast doubt on Britain’s intentions in a number of
issues, ranging from foreign policy to direct investment.
However, history does not only explain negative perceptions. Britain’s attrac-
tion as a political and economic example also results from the historical view
that categorizes the UK as part of the developed nations of the West, with a sta-
ble parliamentary democracy and industrialization. As such, Turkish political
elite set the UK, along with other countries, as a benchmark with which to com-
pare their own political, economic, educational and other achievements (Çapan
and Zarakol 2019). This article shows that perceptions reflecting history are
deep-seated and whether positive or negative, they are difficult to change.
This finding has significant policy implications. If memories of the past are
resilient and if, in countries like Turkey, no amount of goodwill can eradicate
suspicions, soft power cannot be significantly improved through deliberate
actions geared toward increasing familiarity with the UK abroad (Rawnsley
2018). In other words, there will be limits to advertisement campaigns such as
GREAT (Pamment 2015), policies such as increasing aid spending, investing in
institutions like the BBC, providing more scholarships to international students
or relaxing visa regulations to attract tourists and businesses (House of Lords
2014; MacDonald 2018b, 39). There is no doubt that all of these are important
in securing Britain’s top spot among soft power nations. However, they are
unlikely to lead to substantial changes in the short run. Therefore, multilateral
cooperation remains to be the most important, tangible and cost-effective way
of maintaining and improving Britain’s soft power.
Britain as a soft power: the evidence
British foreign policy on projecting soft power rests on the cliche that the UK
can ‘punch above its weight’ and has a distinctive ‘role in the world,’ with a
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potential to provide global leadership (McCourt 2011). This belief results in
part from the favourable rankings of the UK in soft power indices, which place
the country comfortably in the top five and even number one in some years
(for example, McClory 2015). Yet, the results from these league tables have
also led to concerns that Britain is vulnerable because competing soft powers
score close and the UK can lose its dominant status due to ‘complacency,
hubris and neglect’ (MacDonald 2018b, 3; also see 2019, 37–43). With Brexit,
there is further risk that the UK may slip down in the rankings. In fact, the
trend appears to have already started, with the UK being positioned sixth in
the recent Monocle Magazine 2019 league table (Monocle Films 2019).
The most reputable studies in the British context, evaluating the soft power
rankings of countries, include the yearly Portland’s Soft Power 30 index (for
example, McClory 2015), Monocle Magazine annual surveys (initially in
cooperation with the Institute for Government, McClory 2010; 2011; 2012) and
British Council reports (for example, Singh and MacDonald 2017; Campbell-
Cree and Lotten 2018; MacDonald 2018a). Measuring countries’ relative cap-
acity in persuasion, attraction and trust, these studies follow three methods to
gather data, either alone or in combination: public opinion polls conducted
across the world; ‘subjective’ expert panels assessing each country’s strength in
several criteria; ‘objective’ metrices collected from other quantitative sources,
such as tourist visit numbers, number of top universities in global rankings,
number of embassies abroad, and so forth.
These studies point at Britain’s various soft power assets with different
degrees of emphasis. In general, high levels of economic wellbeing and per-
sonal income levels, as well as democratic institutions and liberal political val-
ues, explain why developed countries are at the top of league tables (Singh
and MacDonald 2017; MacDonald 2018a, 68–71). The UK, however, appears to
be at the forefront of these developed nations with its openness to diversity,
individual liberties, freedom of press, accountable institutions and the rule of
law (MacDonald 2019, 12–13). While the monarchy can be a cultural source of
appeal, the reputation of the country as the longest running parliamentary
democracy increases its political capital (Hill and Beadle 2014, 23, 30–31,
33–34). Finally, although the UK is the weakest in science and technology
when compared to other soft powers (MacDonald 2019, 38), it still stands out
in the indices because of its diplomacy, education, arts and culture, and sports.
In terms of diplomacy, the UK has been identified as a leading nation due
its ‘impressive diplomatic infrastructure, a highly regarded diplomatic corps,
and strong historical ties to a global network of states,’ such as the
Commonwealth, and involvement in multilateral organizations, such as the
UN. Connected also with its cultural assets, ‘the strength of Britain’s public
diplomacy institutions —notably the BBC World Service and British Council’—
are also cited as major advantages (McClory 2011, 15–16). Additionally, the UK
appears to be a benevolent power and a force for good with its development
assistance programmes and participation in international humanitarian mis-
sions. Cooperation with other nations, which uphold similar desirable values,
and in multilateral settings contributes to this positive diplomatic image (Hill
and Beadle 2014, 31–33; MacDonald 2019, 32–33, 43).
The UK’s natural heritage sites, museums, art galleries, musical talents, fes-
tivals, historic and contemporary literature, intellectuals and globally popular
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brands can be seen as the ‘traditional pillars of British cultural appeal’ (Hill
and Beadle 2014, 24). This attractiveness is obviously buttressed by the English
language, which also sustains education as a soft power resource. Britain
attracts thousands of foreign students each year, has a high number of univer-
sities in top 100, and Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, among others, are
world-leading institutions. In sports, the UK is seen as the main site of popular
games, such as golf and football, with the Premier League games drawing mil-
lions of global viewers (Hill and Beadle 2014, 23–30; MacDonald 2019, 40–42).
The results from these indices help understand Britain’s main soft power
assets and shape foreign policy. Yet, these studies have well-documented limi-
tations, also acknowledged by practitioners (Hill and Beadle 2014, 12; McClory
2015, 23; Singh and MacDonald 2017, 29–30). One weakness is the focus on
positive attributes. Questions and criteria are designed to understand a coun-
try’s level of soft power, usually in terms of Nye’s (2004, 11–15) original con-
ceptualization based on culture, political values and foreign policy. Metrics
measure only ‘the relative strength of countries’ soft power resources’
(Portland 2020b) or rank ‘the world’s major players according to the soft
power reserves they command’ (McClory 2010, 8). If any negative attributes,
such as corruption levels, violence in society or income inequality, are meas-
ured (for example McClory 2011), they are always given less attention when
compared to positive metrics. Public opinion polls, such as the British
Council’s youth surveys (for example, see Campbell-Cree and Lotten 2018),
have a further weakness in that they are ‘artificially’ conducted with the spe-
cific question of soft power in mind. Thus, results are not collected in a
‘natural’ setting in an ‘unobtrusive’ manner (Lee 2000).
Additionally, it is not easy to tell why one country receives a place below
or above another on a specific question. Since indices repeat their surveys in
different years, changes from one year to another can be interpreted looking at
the significant events that happened during the course of the survey period.
For instance, while the USA’s recent decline in the rankings may be seen as a
result of the Trump administration’s poor management of diplomatic relations,
Japan’s rise can be explained in part by the impending Olympic games
(Monocle Films 2019). Aside from these trends, it is possible to make assump-
tions on individual level contingencies. Opinion polls show that those who
have visited a country, done business with it or interacted with its culture, per-
ceive the country in more positive terms (Campbell-Cree and Lotten 2018;
MacDonald 2019, 14–23). However, these correlations and assumptions miss
important underlying reasons for differences of opinion and cannot provide a
deeper understanding as to why individuals would choose to interact with one
country rather than another in the first place.
Moreover, public opinion polls, expert questionnaires or other data collec-
tion methods do not necessarily reflect the views of decision-makers. It has
been argued that ‘key components’ of soft power are ‘impossible’ to measure
‘in terms of the attitudes of foreign decision-makers … because the data are
simply unavailable’ (Hill and Beadle 2014, 12). However, if soft power is about
making other countries desire what you prefer, then measuring it must also
include assessments of how other countries’ elites perceive yours. It is these
elite preferences that would shape decisions and make a difference in inter-
national relations, to the benefit or detriment of a soft power nation.
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This article addresses these gaps by looking at Turkish politicians’ percep-
tions toward the UK. The British Council youth surveys, conducted every two
years in G20 countries, demonstrate the significance of Turkey as a case study
and how a richer analysis of this country can illuminate the UK’s strongest
soft power assets and its biggest challenges. In the 2018 survey (MacDonald
2018a), globally, the UK was ranked fourth in its attractiveness, third in trust
in government and second in trust in its people and institutions. Despite these
good results, the same survey in Turkey ranked Britain below the average.
Indeed, the UK’s worst rankings in attractiveness and in trust in its people
was in Turkey, along with results from Russia, Mexico and Saudi Arabia. The
Turkish youth ranked the UK between seventh and eighth in these indicators
of soft power. The results of trust in the UK government were slightly better.
However, even in this case, the UK occupied the sixth place, with results only
from Russia and Argentina being worse than the ones from Turkey
(MacDonald 2018a, 72; also see Campbell-Cree and Lotten 2018).
Other public opinion polls from Turkey reveal the preponderance of nega-
tive perceptions toward the UK. For instance, in a 2019 survey, the mean result
in response to the statement ‘political, military and economic cooperation with
the UK should be further strengthened’ was 2.7 on a scale of 1 (strongly dis-
agree) to 5 (strongly agree). Only 27.5% of the respondents agreed that stron-
ger relations with Britain would be desirable (KONDA 2019). In another poll,
63% of respondents mentioned the UK in response to the question, ‘which
country or countries pose threat to Turkey?’. This result placed the UK as the
fourth most threatening country after the USA, Israel and France (Aydın et al
2019). This outcome also shows the significance of asking negatively worded
questions. Even though the UK received its lowest scores in the British Council
surveys from Turkey, they were still in the top 10 among 20 nations, poten-
tially making the results appear relatively good. Yet, other surveys with differ-
ent questions show that perceptions may in fact be worse.
Given these overall unfavourable public opinion results, Turkey is a crucial
case to further investigate. Uncovering areas where Turkish respondents attri-
bute soft power to Britain would demonstrate the UK’s most promising soft
power assets; and by clarifying the underlying reasons for negative percep-
tions of the UK, it would also reveal the most significant challenges the UK
faces in projecting soft power, and whether these can be remedied. Aside from
general lessons that can be learned from the case, Turkey is also a critical
country for Britain in its own terms. It is a non-EU, non-Commonwealth
emerging power (Oguzlu and Parlar Dal 2013) that also ranks in the top 30 as
a soft power (Portland 2020a). As such, it is both a potential rival and a vital
ally of the UK as London reshapes its foreign policy goals post-Brexit.
Understanding Turkish political elite’s perceptions toward the UK would
make cooperation with Ankara in global platforms, and in Europe’s neighbour-
hood, rest on more stable pillars.
Turkish political elite’s attitudes toward the UK
The main data for this paper comes from the parliamentary proceedings of the
Turkish National Assembly (TNA) from June 2011 to May 2018. This seven-
year period corresponds to the 24–26 parliamentary terms and covers nearly
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900 sessions of the TNA. This is a period under the dominance of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
–AKP) except for the brief 25th parliamentary term. In the UK, the era under
study starts one year into the first David Cameron government and closes one
year before the end of the second Theresa May cabinet. The year range
includes important contemporary events on both sides, such as the 2016 Brexit
referendum and, in Turkey, the 2013 Gezi Park protests, the 2016 coup attempt
and the 2017 presidential referendum.
In order to discern the attitudes of Turkish parliamentarians toward the
UK, Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA) methodology was employed, and
research was carried out following four main steps (Schreier 2012). First, the
minutes of more than 890 parliamentary sessions, which are publicly available
online,1 were searched for keywords, related to the UK in Turkish (such as
_Ingiltere, Birleşik Krallık). Meaningful segments containing the keywords from
the speeches of MPs concerning the agenda of the day and parliamentary
questions were collected into MS Word documents.2
Second, a coding frame was built, drawing upon prior research on Britain’s
soft power assets, as discussed above. Three main categories of coding were
made, relating to the perceptions of the lawmakers, the main issue the UK was
referenced with, and whether the UK was mentioned alone or with other coun-
tries. The frame was tested by coding one third of the segments (units of ana-
lysis) two times. The first trial was approximately one year before the main
analysis, followed by sharing the coding frame with experts on Turkey in aca-
demic conferences. Taking into consideration their suggestions, the frame was
revised and tried out again two months prior to the actual start of the analysis.
These revisions allowed each category to be finetuned and increased the reli-
ability of the coding frame.
In the final step, the main analysis was carried out by coding each unit of
analysis containing a reference to the UK in the speeches of Turkish parliamen-
tarians. Each segment was coded three times—coding for perceptions, issues
and multilateralism—using the software MAXQDA Analytics Pro 2018
(Release 2018.2.4). Altogether 1208 units were coded, making it possible to
examine the political elite’s perceptions of the UK in more depth.3
1 The pdf versions of the minutes can be found in TBMM 2020a. The records of each session
are also available in html format in TBMM 2020b. Mostly pdf versions were used in collecting
data, but when the pdf files failed to download on occasion, the html version was also consulted.
2 In other words, all commission reports, draft laws and their preambles, as well as all other
documents that were not speeches, were omitted. Quick comments and interruptions of MPs’
speeches were also discarded. Speeches outside of the agenda were omitted because these short
declarations at the beginning of each session frequently contained lawmakers’ notes of the
anniversary of their constituencies’ liberation from enemy occupation. Referring to the War of
Independence, these announcements were biased toward negative perceptions of the UK. Other
rarely significant matters that were brought to the assembly’s attention by these kinds of speeches
were referred to again in the following proceedings of the same session. These repetitions
prevented any important material to be missed by avoiding the speeches outside of the agenda.
For more on these types of speeches in the TNA, see Neziroglu (2009, 80–82).
3 The data is publicly available in mx18 and pdf formats through two alternative links:
https://doi.org/10.17036/researchdata.aston.ac.uk.00000478 or http://www.yaprakgursoy.com/
projects-and-field-research. The mx18 data can be used for replication and further analysis by
using MAXQDA or similar software while the pdf can be used for seeing the coded segments.
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Overview of perceptions
Based on the most frequent patterns of referring to the UK in the TNA pro-
ceedings, the main category of perceptions was further broken down into nine
general codes. A residual category of ‘unclear’ was created for segments where
it was not possible to note the attitudes of the speaker. Only 45 segments
(3.7%) were coded under this residual category. The frequencies of each
remaining category are shown in Figure 1.
According to these descriptive statistics, the UK has been referred to as a
positive model the most, representing 449 segments and nearly 40% of the
coded units. This coding was used where the UK was given as a good example
or referred to as a role model, suggesting that Turkey should emulate past or
current practices, policies or legislation in the UK. While some of these seg-
ments were quite detailed in praising the UK, others were in passing, often
accompanied by some statistical information and with other countries to make
the point that Turkey needs to improve or is falling behind global standards.
The ‘negative example’ category, which was applied to 129 segments (11%)
was similar to the ‘positive model’ classification in that the UK was taken as a
benchmark. However, in these cases, it was implied that Turkey was better,
should not aim to be like the UK or that the comparison was invalid. In sev-
eral instances of this category, the discussion derived from Britain being
referred to as a positive example by the government or several MPs, which in
turn led to others arguing against this analogy. In some other instances, the
UK was used as a benchmark by the AKP government to show how Turkey
had progressed in one particular area, surpassing the UK. Both the ‘positive
model’ and ‘negative example’ sub-categories imply that Britain is used as a
yardstick by Turkish parliamentarians. These two groups of segments can be
read together as the most common perception, making up nearly half of all
references to the UK, suggesting that ‘leading by example’ is the strongest
British soft power asset among the Turkish political elite.
Other positive judgements on the UK in the parliamentary proceedings
included ‘source for validation’ (117 segments), ‘partner’ (62 segments), Britain
being ‘better or stronger’ in a given situation (35 segments) and ‘example of a
global trend’ (17 segments). Even with generous interpretations, these four cat-
egories make up a total of 20% of the coded segments, falling significantly
behind the role model perception, which is the predominant positive source of
British soft power.
Figure 1. Perceptions of the UK in the TNA speeches (2011–18).
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The ‘partner’ category was used in the broadest sense possible during cod-
ing and was applied to all Turkish MP speeches that implied cooperation.
Simply agreeing with the UK in a particular instance, such as showing sym-
pathy after the Manchester Arena Bombing in 2017, was also included in this
category. The overall low frequency of this code is notable given that the UK
was sympathetic to the AKP government after the July 2016 coup attempt and
had been a persistent supporter of Turkey’s membership in the EU (Altın€ors
2020). Although the UK is acknowledged as an important international partner
by the AKP governments (TC Dışişleri Bakanlıgı 2020), these perceptions did
not come forward in the TNA proceedings as the dominant view.
The ‘source for validation’ code was employed for segments that quoted a
citation, an award, anecdote or an idiom from Britain, in order to confirm a
certain achievement or point. Citations ranged from newspaper reports to
statements from politicians. They covered a wide range of references from cen-
turies ago to recent ones. The accessibility of English as a language cannot be
denied in these citations, but they also indicate that Britain is seen as some-
what of ‘an authority’ or as an outside source of significance.
The code ‘Britain being better or more powerful’ was applied to segments
in the broadest possible terms, covering even implications of the UK having
higher prestige vis-a-vis third countries. In the final category, Britain was given
as an example of how global politics was changing with the 2008 financial cri-
sis or Brexit. These references to the UK were only loosely associated with
soft power.
Indeed, the most significant perception after ‘positive model’ are feelings of
hostility toward the UK. Turkish lawmakers referred to the UK in antagonistic
terms in 286 instances, implying that they saw Britain as an enemy, a threat or
as a country that had acted against Turkish interests. This category included
past and contemporary events, as well as acts against Ottoman or Turkish eco-
nomic or strategic interests. Accusations directed at domestic actors, such as
the government, for cooperating with the UK to the detriment of Turkish inter-
ests were also included in this category.
References to the UK as an imperial power, colonizer or as an actor that
had meddled in the affairs of other regions and countries were mentioned in
68 instances, categorized under ‘aggressive global power.’ Together with ‘the
enemy’ code, negative views represent 30.4% of all references to the UK in the
Turkish parliament between 2011 and 2018. Thus, although Britain has soft
power over Turkey especially as a model, antagonistic feelings also exist side
by side, indicating the fragile balance between positive and negative attitudes
toward the UK.
Issues and perceptions: strongest areas of soft power and biggest challenges
The second category of coding was about issues or topics with which the UK
was mentioned in the TNA. This second set of codes had 17 categories. The
codes ‘economy,’ ‘foreign policy,’ and ‘migration’ were further broken down
to 12 sub-headings to capture details. Figure 2 shows the most common issues
that were mentioned without the sub-headings. The ‘other’ category contains
the least mentioned seven topics: sports, tourism, science and innovation,
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leaked documents, personal data protection, violence against women, and
urbanization and gentrification.
As it can be clearly seen from the figure, the most common issues that Britain
was mentioned with are politics, economy, foreign policy and history. Similar to
perceptions, these four codes were interpreted as broadly as possible in order to
provide a general overview of attitudes. The ‘politics’ category (266 instances)
included matters related to democracy, checks and balances, human rights, indi-
vidual liberties, corruption and government budget, as well as concerns about
regional autonomy, minority rights and local governments. In the latter issues,
the UK was mentioned often in reference to Turkey’s Kurdish conflict.
The ‘economy’ category (235 segments) consisted of matters related to
trade, finance, industry, foreign direct investment (FDI), business, agriculture,
natural resources, unemployment, social security, domestic energy and con-
cerns with global warming related to the economy.
The third most frequently mentioned issue was foreign policy (229 seg-
ments), which included discussions associated with international relations,
military deployments, international organizations (such as NATO and the EU)
and Turkish FDI in other countries when it related more to Turkish influence
in its neighbourhood rather than the economy. Segments on Cyprus and the
Eastern Mediterranean, foreign-born terrorism, Brexit, visa, and military and
intelligence capabilities were also subsumed under this main category.
Finally, the code ‘history’ (196 instances) was used whenever the UK was
mentioned with respect to a historical event up until the 1960s, when Britain’s
global role and influence in the Middle East declined following the Suez Canal
crisis. Most references in this category pertained to relations during the Ottoman
Table 1. Co-occurance of the code 'Positive
Model' with different issues.
Number of
segments %
Politics/Government 168 37
Economy 73 16
Judicary/Law
Enforcement
35 8
Education 35 8
Health 24 5
Figure 2. References to the UK in the TNA in term of issues (2011–18).
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Empire, the First World War, the Turkish War of Independence and the early
Turkish Republican Period of the 1930s. This code was used when the main
speech was not necessarily on history, but when the UK was brought up in this
context, such as an example of how Britain (or others) could be expected to
behave given their past actions.
The co-occurrence of the detailed issues with the ‘positive model’ category
reveals the strongest areas of British soft power in Turkey. Table 1 shows the
top five topics, with ‘politics/government’ coding clearly leading this set of co-
occurrences. Several examples can be given to better explain the nature of
these segments. For instance, how the UK dealt with domestic conflict, seces-
sionism and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was cited as a possible model
for Turkey’s conflict with the Kurdish movement and the Kurdistan Workers'
Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê –PKK). Aspects of British democracy, such as
its historical evolution from Magna Carta onward, parliamentary practices or
the admirable relationship between government and opposition parties, were
also mentioned in the speeches of lawmakers to highlight the deficiencies of
Turkish democracy. At times, the UK was mentioned in passing with statistical
comparisons to support legislation or to criticize the government, such as in
the matter of squandering away the budget with expensive official cars. The
breadth of possible examples provided by the Turkish politicians were quite
wide, but overall, it is clear that the strongest area of British soft power in the
seven years examined here was its democratic heritage and political values.
Politics is followed by the economy, which was also seen 16% of the time
as a positive example that Turkey could mirror. Instances of this co-occurrence
of codes include (but are not limited to) matters related to taxation, nuclear
power plants, size of agricultural lands, minimum wage and labour rights.
After the category ‘economy,’ the most frequent co-occurrence was with
‘justice system/law enforcement’ which made up 8% of positive model refer-
ences. Examples of this co-occurrence include discussions of anti-terror law,
mechanisms of mediation to decrease the number of court cases and the ratio
of detention-conviction rates. References to the UK’s education system were
also relatively high, as previous studies on British soft power would predict.
Turkish MPs brought up this issue in discussions related to education in the
mother tongue, the quality of research publications in the universities and the
overall standards of primary school education.
In the issue of health, the UK was mostly given as an example in legislation
related to the use of starch-based sugar in food production, violence against
health personnel and in the controversial issue of building new hospitals
through the public-private partnership model. On this last point, the UK, usu-
ally along with Canada, was also mentioned by opposition MPs as a case
where the model failed, and therefore should not be adopted in Turkey. These
references were coded under the ‘negative example’ category and provide a
good example of how the UK could be seen as a good or bad benchmark
depending on the speaker and was mentioned frequently in the context of the
same issue. Overall, these results show that the UK was seen as a role model
by Turkish politicians in a wide variety of topics, with politics being the stron-
gest area.
Yet, counteracting these positive influences, Britain was also perceived as a
threat and an aggressive global power. While previous research on Britain’s
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soft power suggests that the UK’s participation in peacebuilding and global
aid are its main assets, these issues were rarely mentioned in the Turkish par-
liament. Even though Turkey also receives aid from the UK, this role of Britain
was commented on only from a comparative point of view and as a positive
example that Turkey could emulate. More specifically, in 2014, Turkey’s own
international humanitarian aid volume came in third in the global rankings,
after the US and the UK, leading government MPs to boast about this success
(also see the speech of President Erdogan in the TNA, TBMM 2014b, 84).
Similarly, although Turkey has signed defence contracts and cooperated with
the UK in a number of international operations—such as on the coast of
Somalia and Libya—partnership with Britain in foreign affairs was acknowl-
edged in only 30 instances (2.5% of all coded segments). These results indicate
that there are limits to soft power when the target country’s politicians are
also aiming to build their own capacity in the same area. However, this atti-
tude also tells more than a simple disregard for Britain’s benign global role.
Coupled with the legacy of colonialism and imperialism, most international
influence of the UK was perceived from a negative point of view and its main
intentions were approached with suspicion, even when Turkey was cooperat-
ing with the UK.
The underlying reason for this type of scepticism in the UK’s global activ-
ism can be understood by looking at the co-occurrence of the enemy percep-
tion with the top five most cited issues. As Table 2 summarizes, nearly half of
all references to the UK as an enemy or as a threat against Turkish interests,
were mentioned in conjunction with a historical event. The collapse of the
Ottoman Empire, the battles of the First World War, the British occupation of
Istanbul between 1918 and 1923, loss of Middle Eastern territories and conflict
over Mosul loomed large in attitudes toward the UK. These past events were
often times recalled as evidence of how Britain had behaved in international
affairs and how its previous acts of meddling in the Middle East had led to
contemporary conflict. Domestic controversies over the meaning of past experi-
ences also led to recollections of Britain as an old enemy. Similarly, the anni-
versaries of significant events, such as the Gallipoli Campaign or the Siege of
Kut, as well as the heroic liberation of cities during the War of Independence,
were grounds for remembering a long period of conflict with the UK.
As other studies have demonstrated, trust between governments lead to
significant economic and international benefits (Campbell-Cree and Lotten
2018, 13–15). In the case of Turkey, some of these benefits are naturally lost
Table 2. Co-occurance of the code 'Enemy' with
different issues.
Numbers of
Segments %
History 134 47
Foreign Policy/International
Relations
48 17
Foreign Direct Investment 42 15
Politics/Government 16 6
Culture 9 3
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since mistrust in Britain due to past events spills over to perceptions of con-
flicting interests in foreign policy. 17% of references to the UK as a threat were
related to current matters in foreign policy. Nearly half of these co-occurrences
were related to Cyprus, the manner it was lost to the British in the 19th century
and the continuing military presence of the UK on the island against Turkish
interests. Opposition lawmakers were also critical of the UK’s alleged support
for the AKP and thought that the UK governments viewed the party as a
model for moderate Islam in the rest of the Middle East, at least in its initial
years in power. There were also frequent references to the UK’s influence in
Syria, Iraq and the rest of the Middle East, as well as its support for Kurdish
groups in the region, as being a threat to Turkish national interests.
British FDI in Turkey was perceived negatively due to a couple of bad
experiences, most notably the condonement of a whisky company’s customs
debt and environmental concerns over nickel mining by a British corporation
in western Turkey. These experiences and the overall aversion of foreign cap-
ital and privatizations led to adversarial references to British FDI in general.
In domestic political issues, again due to an understanding of the UK’s his-
torical role in the region, Britain was viewed at times as a threat against
Turkish national interests, for instance, in reference to the Kurdish minority.
Lawmakers implied that Britain (and other countries) were interfering against
stable peace in favour of Turkey in the Kurdish conflict. Britain was also
shunned for criticizing Turkey’s regime and the referendum to change the con-
stitution to a presidential system. Finally, cultural artefacts and archaeological
finds were taken away to Britain in the past, which is a long-standing area of
dispute that was brought up in the co-occurrence of the codes ‘enemy’
and ‘culture’.
In sum, the results from the Turkish parliament demonstrate that although
the strongest area of British soft power is its exemplary politics and govern-
ment, its greatest challenge is historical experiences of animosity. This is a
dilemma that appeared sometimes even in the same speech of a lawmaker
(see, for example, TBMM 2014a, 95–96; 2015, 850–851). Both perceptions reflect
deep-seated understandings of Britain and do not appear to be influenced eas-
ily from day-to-day events. They also show the limits of public opinion sur-
veys designed specifically to measure a country’s soft power assets.
Unilateralism versus multilateralism: strengthening British soft power
The UK may not be able to change some of the entrenched perceptions result-
ing from historical experiences. However, research on the Turkish parliamen-
tary proceedings support the argument put forward by previous studies that
acting multilaterally may help improve British soft power.
During QCA, each segment from the TNA was coded also in terms of the
same type of references the lawmakers made to other countries. As it can be
seen from Figure 3, a clear majority of remarks about the UK also contained a
similar assertion on at least one more country (64% of coded segments).
Although within the UK, some of the discussions on Brexit revolved around
the idea of cooperating more with the Commonwealth countries and the US, it
is noticeable that from the Turkish MPs' point of view, the UK is not seen in
this type of grouping, except for references to Canada in the ‘negative
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example’ category as explained above. Similarly, seeing the UK only together
with the US was rare, when compared with joint remarks with other
European countries.
If segments included countries from both Europe and the US, they were coded
under ‘with other global cases.’ However, this category also included references
to all countries anywhere from the globe. Unsurprisingly, most frequent coun-
tries cited together with the UK, other than Western ones, were other soft or ris-
ing powers, such Russia, Japan, South Korea, China, South Africa or Mexico.
The co-occurrences of different perceptions with degrees of multilateralism
clearly show the significance of international cooperation for soft power (see
Table 3). In the category of ‘enemy’ and ‘aggressive global actor,’ the most fre-
quent references were to the UK alone. Conversely, in the strongest area of
soft power, namely ‘positive model,’ Britain was mentioned together with
other global cases the most. This result would not change if the ‘negative
example’ category was added to the ‘positive model.’ In the other optimistic
perception categories of ‘partner’ and ‘better/more powerful,’ the UK was
seen in combination with other countries from around the world.
As a ‘source for validation’, the UK was cited on its own more, but this is
mostly due to the characteristic of the code itself, which contains citations
from the UK. In other words, there is not much room in a speech to cite vari-
ous quotes from different countries. The UK was referenced alone in the cat-
egory of ‘example of a global trend’ mostly because of Brexit, which is a
unique occurrence. Setting these codes aside, it is clear from the results that if
Britain wants to increase its soft power, it should continue its activism together
with other countries and not just with the US or the Commonwealth.
In a setting where historical legacies cannot be undone or improved, multi-
lateralism seems to be the only possibly effective policy choice. Although there
are calls for the UK to ‘chart its own course’ and avoid being ‘a poodle of
Washington or a lapdog of Brussels’ (House of Lords 2014, 62), it is important
to reiterate that in seeking independence from other global actors, the UK
should not ignore multilateral cooperation.
Conclusion
The future of Britain’s soft power, and how it can use and improve its resour-
ces to increase its international influence, is an ongoing academic and policy
debate. The issue will only increase in salience as the UK aims to find itself a
Figure 3. References to the UK in the TNA with other countries (2011–18).
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new role in changing global circumstances in the post-COVID-19 era and with
Brexit. This article contributed to the debate on British soft power by investi-
gating political elite perceptions of the UK in Turkey. Methodologically, it
addressed the limitations of soft power metrices that look at the views of the
public and cannot provide a deeper understanding of negative perceptions. As
one of the countries that has perceived the UK in a relatively more negative
light, Turkey as a case study was illuminating. The analysis stressed the sig-
nificance of history and past experiences, highlighted the importance of multi-
lateralism, and established the UK’s political and democratic model as its
greatest soft power asset.
As with any method to measure soft power, this article also had its limita-
tions. Some of the findings, naturally, reflect Turkey’s history with the UK. As
already mentioned in the article, Anglo-Turkish relations have historically fluc-
tuated between animosity and partnership. British predominance in the
Middle East and Balkans during the colonial era resulted in thorny relations
between the Ottoman Empire and the UK, which led them to take opposing
sides during the First World War. Adversarial relations continued in the deca-
des that followed the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 although
both countries became NATO members after the Second World War. The most
significant problems were the withdrawal of Britain from Cyprus in 1960, the
subsequent turmoil on the island and Turkey’s intervention in 1974.
Despite these historical problems, the UK had become themost fervent supporter
of Turkey’s EU accession after its membership in 1973. Britain emphasized Turkey’s
geographical location and military contribution to Western security as the primary
reasons why Europe would benefit from enlargement toward the east. The two
countries shared similar approaches to international terrorism and domestic separat-
ism, advocating military responses and security cooperation as the best means to
combat these threats. Both the UK and Turkey positioned themselves in international
relations differently than the rest of the European countries, in part due to their close
alliances with the US, at least until recently. Unlike many European countries that
Table 3. Co-occurance of different perceptions with multilateralism (number
of segments).
The UK
Alone
With other
Global Cases
With
Europe
With
the US
With the
Commonwealth SUM
Positive model 103 169 147 29 1 449
Enemy 129 70 66 20 1 286
Source for Validation 88 15 5 8 1 117
Negative Example 40 32 38 8 11 129
Aggressive Global
Actor
29 20 10 8 1 68
Partner 12 36 13 1 0 62
Better/More
Powerful
9 16 5 5 0 35
Example of a
Global Trend
9 5 2 1 0 17
Unclear 16 18 5 6 0 45
SUM 435 381 291 86 15 1208
Note: A bold number indicates the highest score in a row. A highlight indicates the highest score in
a column.
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raised concerns over immigration and human rights violations in Turkey, British
governments did not seek to form bilateral relations to address these issues primar-
ily, despite the existence of a Turkish immigrant community in the UK.
In the aftermath of the Brexit referendum and the July 2016 coup in
Turkey, the two countries have entered a new phase in their domestic politics
and relations with Europe. By analysing the perceptions of the Turkish policy-
makers toward the UK, and covering the time period which included these
two significant developments as well, this article contributed to the way bilat-
eral relations can be rethought and based on a firmer footing.
For the future of soft power studies, it is clear that the history of Anglo-Turkish
bilateral relations as briefly outlined here will not be replicated elsewhere. Britain’s
soft power in other seemingly more negative countries identified by previous stud-
ies, such as Argentina, Russia or Saudi Arabia, would have their own historic or
contemporary reasons for these perceptions. Similarly, politicians in former colo-
nies of the British Empire would approach the UK quite differently on a number of
issues, such as FDI, development aid or international cooperation.
Thus, the significance of this article for soft power studies is not necessarily
the generalizability of its specific results, but its overall finding that percep-
tions reflect deep-seated historical understandings that may be quite resilient
and difficult to change through immediate actions. The article also calls for the
re-evaluation of methodologies geared toward measuring a country’s soft
power. Rather than accepting the fact that there are no data availability on
individual country elite views, research similar to the one conducted for this
article can be employed to analyse the attitudes of politicians in other nations.
Through data available from parliamentary or governmental archives, politi-
cians’ views of the UK and other soft power nations can be examined in an
unobtrusive manner. Given the amount of time and resources such research
would require, countries that rank the UK lower or higher than the average
can be selected to provide more insights into the strengths and weaknesses of
British soft power. In combination with already existing research, these types
of new methods would allow for the formulation of well-informed and cost-
effective foreign policy choices.
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